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The current special issue has as its focus the relationship between behavioral science and 
clinical psychology. Clinical psychology encompasses many schools of thought, one of 
which is the behavioral science wing. This wing encompasses a broad range of interests, 
including the use of applied behavior analysis (ABA) as in developmental disabilities and 
clinical behavior analysis (CBA) in psychotherapy. The eight conceptual papers in the current 
issue focus on one or both of these areas. One of the key themes of these papers is an  
attempt to articulate the links between the authors’ clinical interests and existing or new 
concepts and practices in behavioral science. 
Three papers contribute to issues that are directly relevant to ABA. First, the paper by 
Greer attempts to advance behavior analysis generally by offering the concept of learned 
reinforcement as the selector of behavior. Specifically, Greer describes how the learning of 
new reinforcers results in the development of verbal operants that may significantly influence 
the practice of ABA. Second, the article by Hayes et al. offers new tools to ABA therapists, 
by exploring the benefits of acceptance and commitment training or therapy (ACT) for ABA. 
Third, the paper by Kavanagh, Barnes-Holmes, and Barnes-Holmes focuses on the behavioral 
processes involved in relational perspective-taking, and false belief. In doing so, the paper 
offers an alternative approach to traditional mainstream views of this subject, which is likely 
to be of benefit to ABA practitioners. 
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The five remaining papers, in our view, contribute to CBA. First, the paper by 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, and McEnteggart presents an updated version of relational 
frame theory (RFT) and its implications for process-based psychotherapy. Second, Callaghan 
and Follette present interpersonal behavior therapy (IBT), highlighting the importance of 
functional-analytic assessment and adherence to behavioral principles in clinical 
interventions. Third, Ong, Twohig, and Levin’s paper presents process-based cognitive 
behavioral therapy (PB-CBT) as a transtheoretical approach to improving mental health 
service provision. Fourth, Zettle highlights the importance of targeting relevant processes and 
using both process-based and outcome measures, in the context of single-subject designs and 
evidence-based practice. These issues are directly relevant to the contemporary debate around 
the use of treatment manuals, and the distinctions and relative merits of a priori versus post-
hoc manuals. Fifth, the paper by Vlaeyen et al. explicitly advocates for single-subject designs 
and their integration with scientist-practitioner interests.  
 In reflecting upon all eight papers together, it may be useful to return to the title of the 
special issue and in particular to the use of the two terms: process and principle. These terms 
often appear to be used interchangeably in the literature. Given the extent to which these 
terms feature in contemporary conversations in clinical psychology and in the search for new 
clinical treatments (see Hoffman & Hayes, 2019), perhaps the special issue should begin by 
considering whether a distinction between the two terms should be made. That is, what is the 
difference, if any, between a process and a principle?  
In psychology, the term “process” is used in many different ways, including as a 
mental process, a brain process, a behavioral process, and a social process. In contrast, the 
term “principle” has been more strongly and traditionally associated with the field of 
behavior analysis (as in ‘principles of behavior analysis’; e.g., Grant & Evans, 1984). Why 
has behavior analysis so often employed the term principle rather than process? We would 
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contend that processes do not require analyses, but principles do. In so far as we are correct, 
the distinction between processes and principles seems to be fundamentally important to the 
contemporary conversation about the importance of basic processes in the assessment and 
treatment of human psychological suffering. 
The term process seems to be used to refer to psychological change that occurs 
independently from any form of analysis. For example, “awareness” may be referred to as a 
process that occurs whether or not it is being analyzed for any given purpose. By contrast, a 
principle seems to require some specification of the act of the analysis by the scientist or 
clinician. Interestingly, Catania (1979) hinted at this distinction within behavior analysis in 
between “operation” and “process”. For example, he argued that reinforcement as an 
operation involves specifying a contingency between responding and consequences; 
reinforcement as a process involves a change in the response pattern that has been shown to 
be due to that contingency and not to some other factor. Combining operation and process 
renders the term principle more appropriate, at least within behavior analysis. Specifically, 
claiming that behavior changed because of a contingency requires some form of analysis to 
determine if that was in fact the case. In other words, a principle requires that you 
demonstrate prediction and influence over a process. Critically, therefore, a principle requires 
that you specify a variable or variables that allow you to control a process; the term process 
alone does not require such specification.  
Going forward, it may be important to more clearly recognize this distinction between 
process and principle in light of the call for process-based therapy. A process-oriented field 
of clinical psychology may be an improvement upon one based on DSM categories, but if it 
remains largely process-based, without a focus on principles, a significant risk seems to 
emerge. Specifically, there may be a tendency to focus on proving which process-based 
model is the best, at the expense of identifying variables that allow you to control or change 
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those processes. In simple terms, process-based therapy is not the end game. Principle-based 
therapy would be the end game because the scientific units of analysis would specify what 
needs to be targeted or manipulated for change, as well as the specific conditions under 
which change occurs.  
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